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The Antecedents of Simultaneous Appointments to CEO and Chair 
 
 
In relay succession, boards add the Chair title to successful CEOs, creating 
duality.  Sometimes boards by-pass relay succession and appoint an individual directly 
into the dual position. We propose that this will occur when there is the need for an 
unambiguous leader and when the appointee has greater bargaining power.  We show that 
following the firing of the predecessor, when the successor is an outsider, and when the 
successor is not the designated heir, the incidence of simultaneous dual appointments 
increases.  We also find that executives appointed into the dual positions are older than 
those appointed only as a CEO.   
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The Antecedents of Simultaneous Appointments to CEO and Chair 
 
 
CEO/Chair duality occurs when one individual holds both leadership positions.  
This leadership structure has received considerable scrutiny from investor groups (e.g., 
Investor Responsibility Research Center) and pension plans such as the California 
Employee Retirement System and the New York City Pension Fund.  These groups 
generally recommend that the CEO position be separated from the board chair position.  
Leading academic researchers have also recommended separation of the two jobs 
(Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  The problem with duality, as argued by its 
critics, is that the board of directors is charged with monitoring manager performance.  If 
the top manager is also the Chair of the board, critics argue that board monitoring of 
managers will be compromised.  The interest in duality is presumably based on the idea 
that it would lead to worse financial performance through increased agency costs than 
when the CEO title and Chair title are not invested in one individual.  That is, by 
reducing board independence and by possibly biasing senior managers’ performance 
appraisals, the firm with a dual leadership structure would not be able to perform as well 
as one with an independent board Chair.   
This agency theory perspective motivates much of the criticism that has been 
placed on the dual governance structure.  The arguments center around the idea that 
duality can lead to a potential abuse of power (Hambrick, 1991; Jensen, 1993).   Kesner 
and Dalton (1986) maintain that duality in a corporation would be the same as one person 
simultaneously occupying the U.S. Presidency and the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court.  Calls for separation of the two positions have come from many sources (e.g. 
Dobrzynski, 1991; Levy, 1981; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Monks and Minow, 1991).  
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Pension funds, mutual funds and other institutional investors have voiced discontent with 
companies that have one person in the CEO and Chair position. 
There is an alternative perspective on duality and it is based on stewardship 
theory.  Here, there are no fundamental problems with managerial motivation; instead 
managers want to perform well and be good stewards of the corporation’s assets on 
behalf of shareholders (Donaldson, 1990a, 1990b; Barney, 1990).  Under stewardship 
theory duality may enable a manager to attain superior performance by giving that person 
complete authority (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  With a dual governance structure there 
would be no doubt about who is in control.  “The organization will enjoy the classic 
benefits of unity of direction and of strong command and control” (Donaldson & Davis, 
p. 52). 
Despite the public attention and recommendations, the dual leadership structure 
has remained one of the dominant management configurations in the United States and 
elsewhere.  The dual leadership structure has been extensively studied, and with few 
exceptions researchers have not found its purported costs to outweigh its benefits (e.g. 
Berg and Smith, 1978; Chaganti et al., 1985; Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993; Daily, 1995; 
Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997; Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993, 1997; Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, and Johnson, 1998; Rechner and Dalton, 1989, 1991; Harris and Helfat, 1998; 
Faleye, 2007).  Its benefits include the establishment of an unambiguous leader.  That is, 
when one person is both CEO and Chair, there is no question in the market place or in the 
firm about who is in charge.   
Duality often occurs in the relay succession process.  In relay successions, boards 
add the Chair title to successful CEOs, creating duality.   Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell 
(1997) find that this relay process is very common in U.S. firms.  Sometimes boards by-
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pass relay succession and appoint an individual directly into the dual position. This 
succession pattern has received considerably less attention from researchers.  The 
purpose of this study is to investigate the motivations behind the decision to appoint an 
individual that is neither CEO nor Chair into the dual position.  Therefore, we focus on 
those CEO successions when the standard relay process is not being followed.  We 
propose that this will occur when there is the need for an unambiguous leader and when 
the appointee has greater bargaining power.   
The board of directors has the responsibility to hire, fire, and promote senior 
managers (Mace, 1971).  Ocasio (1999) argues that boards like to follow succession rules 
when making decisions.  Some succession rules are not written, but are instead informal 
rules that guide behavior (Huse, 2000; Mace, 1971).  By following these informal 
succession rules, boards can lessen internal strife and provide the impression that they are 
meeting their fiduciary responsibilities.  The most common set of succession rules, relay 
succession or passing the baton, has been outlined by Vancil (1987), with updated 
analysis provided by Ocasio (1999), Cannella and Shen (2001, 2002a, 2002b), Harris and 
Helfat, (1998),  and Daily and Dalton (1995, 1997).  Following this set of succession 
rules, duality occurs as a natural step as the board promotes a senior executive.  In relay 
succession, the board adds the Chair title to a successful CEO.  In other words, time spent 
as CEO is like an apprenticeship prior to the board investing both titles in one person. 
Sometimes, however, a board makes a dual appointment of an executive as CEO 
and as Chair at the same time.  While the board may be following a different set of 
succession rules, we suggest that this is not relay succession as it has been previously 
defined (Vancil, 1987).    We hypothesize that boards will promote an executive directly 
into the dual titles when there has been stress on the firms such as poor performance or 
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following the firing of the predecessor. Here, there may be a need for strong and clear 
leadership.  Therefore, we test if dual appointments are more likely when there has been 
poor prior performance, when the predecessor has been fired, when the successor is not 
the designated heir, and when the successor is an outsider.  We also argue that boards will 
be more likely to promote an executive simultaneously as CEO and Chair when the 
executive is more experienced.  Each of these predictions would be consistent with 
duality being used optimally by the firm’s board.   
Our results are consistent with duality being used to provide strong and clear 
leadership.  Our findings do not support a relation between poor performance (as 
measured by the industry-adjusted return on assets) and duality.  We find that 
simultaneous appointments to CEO and Chair are more likely to occur when the 
predecessor has been fired, when the CEO is an outsider, when the CEO has not been the 
heir apparent, and when the CEO is somewhat older.  Prior performance is not 
significantly related to the likelihood that a firm will make a dual appointment, and dual 
appointments do not have power to predict the short term performance of the firm. 
 
DUALITY 
Relay Succession and Duality 
Relay succession is perhaps the most common set of succession practices 
(Fortune, 1988).  In relay succession, duality is a normal part of the succession planning 
process for senior executives.  Vancil (1987) describes relay succession as a process in 
which a company grooms an heir-apparent and promotes the heir into positions of 
increasing authority in the company hierarchy.  In relay succession, the board of directors 
appoints the president or COO as the heir to the CEO.  After a suitable probationary 
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period and when the need for a new CEO occurs, the board appoints the heir to be the 
new CEO.  This probationary period is not fixed and may be highly variable across 
companies.  For example, Cannella and Shen (2001) find that tenure in the heir position 
averages 4.5 years but has a standard deviation of nearly 3.7 years.   After an additional 
probationary period, the board adds the chair title to the CEO.  Thus, duality is simply 
one step in the progression of authority within a company.  As the relay process is 
continuous, the CEO/chair relinquishes the president title and gives it to the new heir.  
When the new heir is ready, (s)he becomes the new CEO while the former CEO retains 
the chair position.  Here the two positions are separate again until the Chair relinquishes 
this title. 
There are other ways in which duality occurs as a progression.  For example, 
some companies utilize the horse race, which is examined by Ocasio (1999) and Cannella 
and Shen (2001).  Here, several executives actively compete for the CEO spot.  The 
winner of the horse race receives promotion to CEO.  Later, this CEO may become board 
chair as well.  As in relay succession, when there is a horse race the chair position does 
not necessarily go to the successor CEO at the time of appointment to CEO.  In both relay 
succession and the horse race, successor CEOs move up through the internal ranks to the 
CEO position and only later become both CEO and chair. 
Companies often choose not to appoint an internal candidate when the situation 
calls for change.  For example, when prior firm performance has been poor (Kesner & 
Sebora, 1994; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993) or when the prior CEO has been fired 
(Borokhovich, Parrino & Trapani, 1996) companies will be more likely to hire an 
outsider as the successor CEO1.  In these instances, there is an apparent need to bypass 
the internal succession process.   
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The same type of situations that persuade boards to by-pass internal succession 
may also create the need for an unambiguous leader.  By appointing a dual successor, 
they send a signal to the external market place (and perhaps to employees in the 
company) that one person is in charge.  The signal implies that there is one leader who 
has the authority to address the situation.  When there has been a problem such as poor 
performance and/or the firing of a CEO, companies may forgo internal succession 
progression and appoint one leader simultaneously as CEO and chair.  For example, 
Davidson, Tong, Worrell, and Rowe (2004) find that when a CEO becomes injured or too 
ill to continue, boards often replace the CEO with the board chair, creating a dual leader. 
Agency Perspective on Duality 
One position on duality is based on agency theory.  Agency theory examines the 
consequences arising from the fact that owners contract with managers to run the firm.  
The manager becomes responsible for the day-to-day operations of the firm and for 
maximizing the utility of the owners.  Agency theory rests on the idea that owners and 
managers of large firms pursue their own personal utility maximization.  As a result, 
decisions made by managers may not always coincide with maximizing owner utility.  
The costs to owners of lost utility are agency costs. 
Owners recognize the potential for agency costs and construct various 
mechanisms to monitor and control managers.  Among these mechanisms is the board of 
directors.  The board is charged with keeping potentially self-serving managers under 
control by, for example, overseeing major strategic decisions, designing pay packages for 
managers, and monitoring manager performance. 
Some agency theorists argue that the dual governance structure allows managers 
to undermine board power (Jensen, 1993).  Under a dual governance structure, the lead 
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manager is the CEO, and this person is also the head of the group that monitors and 
rewards performance.  An analogy would be to allow students to assign their grade in a 
college class when their ability to attain post-graduation employment rests heavily on the 
grade they receive. 
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that the dual governance structure 
could lead to increased agency costs.  For example, Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim, and Nemec 
(2004) find that income-increasing earnings management is greater under newly-
appointed dual leaders than when the newly appointed leader is only a CEO.  Mallette 
and Fowler (1992) find the adoption of poison pills (which can reduce the likelihood of a 
merger) is more likely under dual leadership, and McWilliams and Sen (1997) show 
greater negative abnormal returns occur following anti-takeover amendments when there 
is dual leadership.  Furthermore, dual leadership seems to entrench CEOs by reducing the 
likelihood of their being fired (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993).   
An Alternative Perspective 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) suggest that CEO’s can best accomplish their 
financial goals when they are given sufficient authority2.  For the CEO, this would mean 
being named to the additional position of board chair.  Placing one executive in the dual 
position would thereby promote shareholder wealth maximization.  
How would the CEO/chair further shareholder wealth maximization? Finkelstein 
and D’Aveni (1994) cite early work supporting duality.  For example, duality provides 
unity of command (Fayol, 1949), a leader with clear and unambiguous authority (Massie, 
1965), and lessens confusion and conflict among top managers that report to a single 
leader (Galbraith, 1977). Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) also cite works in 
administrative theory concluding that a strong leader will be better able to set strategic 
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direction and take decisive action (Barnard, 1938; Chandler, 1962; Andrews, 1971; 
Miller & Friesen, 1977).  Boards may choose a dual leader so that it is clear to 
stakeholders that one person is in charge.   
In contrast to the perspective from agency theory, duality would not harm 
shareholders.  Instead, duality would further shareholder interests.   
A Synthesis of Conflicting Perspectives 
 The alternative perspectives on duality are seemingly at odds.  Agency theorists 
would argue that duality should be counter to shareholder wealth maximization as 
shareholders and managers pursue utility maximization with different objectives in mind.  
On the other hand, one could also argue that the CEO/chair with sufficient authority 
would be better able to maximize both their own and shareholders’ utility.  The 
differences in the two views seem to be irreconcilable. 
There is another interpretation.  Perhaps both views are at least partially correct.  
That is, there could be agency costs associated with duality and simultaneously be 
benefits.  So when an executive is placed in a dual role, there are both costs and benefits 
to shareholders (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997).  In some cases the costs may outweigh 
the benefits and in others, the benefits outweigh the costs.  Presumably, a board would 
only install a dual leader when they perceive the benefits of the dual governance structure 
are greater than the perceived costs. 
There is empirical evidence that supports this position.  Some results show the 
potential for agency costs in duality situations (e.g. Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim & Nemec, 
2004; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; McWilliams & Sen, 1997; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993).  
However, studies examining the impact of duality on performance have generally found 
that duality does not impact overall performance (e.g. Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1997; 
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Daily & Dalton, 1997; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998).    Since there appears 
to be the potential for agency costs under a dual regime, but the overall effect of duality 
appears to be neutral, it suggests that there are benefits that offset the costs. 
HYPOTHESES 
We propose that the decision to simultaneously appoint a single person as CEO 
and chair will more likely occur following situations or contingencies that create stress on 
the company.  These situations include things such as poor prior performance, the firing 
of the predecessor CEO, the hiring of an outsider as the successor CEO, and the decision 
to promote someone other than the heir-apparent.  Similarly, boards may feel more 
comfortable hiring or promoting a dual leader who is older, with more experience.  We, 
therefore, develop hypotheses concerning these situations below. 
Duality and Poor Prior Performance 
 Poor prior performance may create a need for change at the top in a corporation 
(Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  Poor performance can be measured by numerous things.  
Generally, poor performance refers to below average profitability or below average stock 
market performance of a firm.  There is considerable research suggesting that turnover 
rates are influenced by prior performance (e.g. Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Furtado & 
Rozeff, 1987; Warner, Watts & Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Denis & Denis, 1995; 
Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; Parrino, 1997).  The relation between poor performance and 
turnover, however, may be mitigated by duality.  Goyal and Park (2002) find that 
turnover rates are lower following poor performance when there is a dual leadership 
structure than when there is not.   
That turnover is influenced by prior performance seems clear.  However, if we 
separate the turnover decision (predecessor chooses to leave the firm, leave the CEO 
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position, or is fired) from the succession decision (the choice of the new CEO), prior 
performance may also influence successor choice.  There is some empirical evidence to 
support this conclusion.  For example, poor prior performance and turnover is often 
followed by the hiring of an outside successor (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993), and relay 
succession is more likely to occur when performance has been good (Cannella & Shen, 
2001). 
Poor prior performance may influence the succession decision in other ways as 
well.  For example, poor performance may also create the need or the board’s perception 
of the need to have a clear and unambiguous leader.  The unambiguous leader that is both 
CEO and chair would have greater authority and, perhaps, have a better chance of 
implementing a plan to turn performance around. We believe that following poor 
performance and CEO turnover, a board may be more likely to appoint a dual executive.  
Thus, poor performance will be a contingency that encourages boards not to follow the 
normal succession progression and to immediately establish a clear leader, a dual 
CEO/chair.  We, therefore, hypothesize: 
H1:  When prior performance has been poor, boards will be more likely to 
simultaneously appoint a CEO successor who is also the chair of the board.   
 
Firing the Predecessor 
Ocasio (1999) suggests that the normal succession rules are more likely to be 
followed when the predecessor has retired.  Empirical research has generally supported 
this contention (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993).  When the board 
fires a CEO, a power vacuum has been created.  The sudden change at the top can create 
confusion not only inside the organization but also to outside constituents.  Here, there 
may be a need or perceived need for an unambiguous leader.  The board may believe that 
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to create the appearance of unified command in the wake of the firing decision that there 
needs to be one leader.  In addition, following the firing of a CEO, there may appear to be 
a power vacuum in the company.  By appointing an undisputed leader, one that is both 
CEO and Chair, the perceptions of a power vacuum may be somewhat alleviated.  We 
expect that subsequent to firing a CEO, that the board will be more likely to bestow the 
successor with both titles, CEO and Chair, than if the predecessor was not fired.   
We, therefore, hypothesize: 
H2:  When the predecessor CEO has been fired, boards will be more likely to 
simultaneously appoint a CEO successor who is also the chair of the board 
than when the predecessor is not fired. 
 
Heir-Apparent 
 Under relay-succession, companies groom heir apparent executives by giving 
them the title of President and/or Chief Operating Officer.  After a training and 
probationary period and when the need arises, the board appoints the designated heir into 
the CEO position.  The former CEO becomes Chair of the board.  Finally, the new CEO 
is also given the title of board Chair, and for a period of time one person is both the Chair 
and the CEO.  A new heir-apparent is now found in the President or COO position. 
Eventually, the CEO title is relinquished to the new heir-apparent and the process begins 
again.  The interaction of these positions during the succession process and its 
implication for the status of duality is touched on by Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) 
and is examined in detail by Worrell, Nemec, and Davidson (1997), Cannella and 
Lubatkin (1993), and Harris and Helfat (1998). 
 Duality may also occur in situations other than relay successions.  In these cases, 
the board places one individual directly into the two positions.  Here, the successor may 
 14 
not have served in one of the heir apparent designations.  Boards may make these 
appointments when they do not believe the original heir-apparent is adequate for the job, 
when a designated heir was never appointed, or when the board wants to follow a process 
other than relay succession.    
Given the progression of authority in relay succession, we expect that the board’s 
promotion of the President or COO into the CEO position will be an indicator that the 
firm is following the standard relay succession model.  They will therefore be less likely 
to simultaneously appoint this person into the Chair position.  We, therefore, hypothesize: 
H3:   CEO successors are less likely to be simultaneously appointed as Chair 
when promoted from the President or COO position than if not promoted 
from these positions. 
 
Successor Origin 
 Firms often hire outside CEOs as a response to poor performance and to signal the 
need for change (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Davidson, Nemec, Worrell, & Lin, 2002; 
Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers & Owers, 1989; Wiersema, 1992).  An outside successor 
charged by the board to instigate change may feel the need for increased authority to 
overcome resistance from insiders and to undertake the needed changes.  Shen and 
Cannella (2002) argue that outside executives lack the internal social networks and 
coalitions that an insider would have and that outside CEO successions can create hostile 
attitudes from insiders toward the new CEO.  The outside CEO may recognize the 
potential for hostility and believe that to be successful greater authority may be 
necessary.  So the outside CEO candidate may bargain for the additional title of Chair.   
In addition, outsiders may bargain for control and argue that to make changes they 
need unambiguous authority.  Presumably the outsider already has current employment 
and may, therefore, be in a position to negotiate multiple titles and the increased authority 
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that the titles convey3.   There may also be a limited pool of acceptable outside 
candidates.  Elsaid, Davidson, and Wang (2008) show that when companies hire outside 
CEOs, nearly half of the outsiders are already CEO at another firm.  So, there is only a 
limited pool of candidates with the requisite leadership experience, and some companies 
may also desire an outside candidate with industry experience making the pool of 
potential candidates even smaller.  These factors may increase the bargaining power of 
the outside successor who may desire the dual role.  An inside candidate, on the other 
hand, as designated heir may have already given-up bargaining power by being an 
insider.  Since the insider has already agreed to be the designated heir, the board may 
believe the insider is unlikely to turn-down the CEO position.  This lessens the insider’s 
bargaining power.  We, therefore, hypothesize: 
H4:  When an outside CEO is hired, boards will be more likely to simultaneously 
appoint a CEO successor who is also the chair of the board than when an 
insider is hired. 
 
Executive Age 
 Brickley (2003) has argued that successor age may be an important determinant of 
CEO selection.  Age may confer experience.  That is, an older executive may give the 
appearance of having greater experience and depth of managerial talent.  Colley, Doyle, 
Logan, and Stettinius (2003) argue that successor age as well as successor experience are 
two key variables utilized by boards in making succession decision.  Boards do not 
generally hire CEOs who are younger than age 40 or executives that are too close to the 
company’ expected retirement age. 
Successor age may also play a role in board decisions to appoint a CEO 
simultaneously as board Chair.   Boards may be more willing to appoint one person into a 
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dual position without the person first serving a CEO apprenticeship when the executive is 
older.  Appointing a dual executive who is older may deflect criticism since the board can 
argue that the executive has the requisite experience simply by virtue of being older and, 
therefore, more experienced. As suggested by Ocasio (1999), boards are able to justify 
their decisions as being consistent with their fiduciary responsibility when they follow 
normal succession rules (e.g. relay succession). To appoint an executive directly into a 
dual position may be seen as inconsistent with the internal succession progression of the 
CEO appointment followed by the dual appointment as CEO/chair and, therefore, 
inconsistent with the board members’ fiduciary responsibility.  In satisfying their 
fiduciary responsibility, board members may feel more comfortable and may justify the 
decision with an appointment of a dual executive who is older and may possess greater 
experience and depth of talent.  We therefore hypothesize: 
H5: Executives simultaneously appointed as CEO and Chair will be older than 
executives appointed only as CEO. 
 
An alternative hypothesis is drawn from Daily and Dalton (1997). They provide 
evidence that the dual executives in their sample display less total tenure with their firms 
than executives holding non-dual titles. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection 
 The ExecuComp data base lists the year of CEO succession.  For the years 1992 
through 1999 we use this data base to determine the year in which companies appoint 
new CEOs.  From this list we found 1017 CEO successions.  To be included in our study, 
we need to obtain information about the predecessor and successor CEOs.  We obtain this 
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additional information from company proxy statements and from news announcements in 
the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and the Lexis Nexis data base.  Using these 
sources we first determined if the succession actually took place, and then we extracted 
information about the executives.   
 Our sample only includes CEO successions.  Some of these successions were 
simultaneous appointments into both the CEO and Chair positions.  We did not include 
promotions from CEO to Chair or CEO to both CEO and Chair positions.  Thus, our 
sample companies that appoint a dual executive are not following the typical pattern of 
promotions that occur in relay succession.  We were able to obtain complete information 
on 745 of the succession announcements.  These companies are our final sample.  As 
shown in Table I, 31% of our sample successions are dual appointments.  Since 
ExecuComp contains information for the S&P 1500, our study is somewhat biased toward 
larger companies. 
-----Insert Table I About Here----- 
 
Description of Variables 
Prior Firm Performance 
We measure prior firm performance with the average return on assets (ROA), for the four 
years before the succession.   We obtain the ROAs from COMPUSTAT by dividing net 
income by total year-end assets.  As discussed in Barber and Lyon (1996), it is 
appropriate to adjust for industry effects so that the profit measure is not just reflecting 
industry activity.  Following a similar procedure to Barber and Lyon, we subtract the 
industry median ROA from the company ROA.  The industry median ROA is the median 
ROA of all companies on COMPUSTAT with the same 2 digit SIC code.  For 
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comparative purposes, we also include the industry adjusted ROA for the four years 
following the succession in our descriptive statistics. 
Firing of Predecessor 
 Hatfield, Worrell, Davidson, and Bland (1999) argue that it is difficult to 
determine whether a CEO has been fired.  To solve this problem, they use only 
successions in which company news releases specifically state that the CEO has been 
fired.  As they indicate, this procedure may miss some firings.  It is not uncommon, for 
example, when a firing takes place, for the board to allow the executive to “save-face” 
and the executive “resigns” to pursue other interests.   
 To solve this problem, we examine several variables that help us to determine if 
CEOs have been fired.  First we determine the predecessors’ ages.  Older CEOs are more 
likely to retire and therefore, less likely to have been fired.  Second, if the former CEO 
remains as board chair, the executive is less likely to have been fired.  We define this 
variable as 1 if the predecessor CEO remains as board Chair and 0 otherwise.  Third, 
when the news announcement states that the predecessor has taken a position with 
another company or organization, then it is likely that the turnover has been initiated by 
the executive and not by the board.  We define this variable to be 1 if the predecessor 
resigns for a new position and 0 otherwise. 
 To include all of these firing-related variables in a multivariate model would be 
problematic because there is considerable correlation among them; each variable is 
theoretically linked to the firing decision.  One method of variable reduction is to 
combine the variables with a factor analysis.  In this way, the portion of the variability 
explained by each of the individual variables is included in a combined variable called 
the factor loading (Berenson, Levine, and Goldstein, 1983).  The factor model creates a 
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factor loading through the variance-covariance matrix. The factor loading is then used as 
a single variable instead of the larger number of individual variables.   Since each of the 
three primary variables has been constructed so that a larger value (e.g. older age, a value 
of 1 if the predecessor remains as Chair, and a value of 1 if the predecessor takes a new 
position) implies that a firing is less likely, the factor loading has a similar interpretation.  
That is when the factor loading is large, it is less likely that the predecessor has been 
fired.   
Successor Age 
From the proxies and the news releases, we determine the successor’s age at the 
time of the succession.  Age is used as a proxy for the experience of the new CEO.  As 
shown in Table I, the average successor is about 52 years old when appointed CEO. 
Successor Origin 
From the proxy statements and the news releases, we determined the number of 
years that the successor had been with the company.  For our tests, we define an outsider 
as a successor with no previous work experience with the company.  Some executives are 
hired from the outside for a short period and then promoted to CEO.  As such, if a CEO 
has been with a company for a very short period of time, would this executive be an 
insider or are they an outsider (Kesner & Sebora, 1994)?  Therefore, we also defined 
outsiders as executives with company tenure of two years or less.  Since this alternate 
designation did not qualitatively change our results, we define outsiders as those with no 
prior company experience for the remainder of the paper.  As shown in Table I, about 
one-third of the successors are outsiders. 
Heir Apparent 
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We designate a relay succession to be one in which the President or COO 
becomes the successor CEO, and therefore could have been considered the heir apparent.  
To identify these firms that appear to be following relay succession practices, we 
compare the names of all newly appointed CEO’s to the names of the President and COO 
in year t-1, as in Davidson, Nemec, and Worrell (2001).  As shown in Table I, 45% of our 
sample successors held one or both of these titles prior to being promoted or appointed to 
CEO or CEO and Chair.  Alternately, it would be better to determine if each company 
had a formal succession plan in place.  We searched proxy statements and news releases 
and found virtually no announcements of adoptions of formal succession plans 
particularly for the earlier years in our sample period.  We, therefore, use the indicator of 
relay succession as given above. 
 
RESULTS 
Univariate Comparisons 
Table I shows univariate comparisons of our test variables. In our sample 229 
firms simultaneously appointed the new CEO as the board Chair and 516 appointed the 
executive as only CEO.  The average industry adjusted ROA is 2.12% in the four years 
prior for both dual successions and non-dual successions.  The lack of a significant 
difference does not support H1.   The factor loading for predecessor firing is 0.85 for 
duality successions and is 0.97 otherwise.  The difference is significant at the 0.001 level 
(t = 6.06).  While the actual values of the factor loadings are difficult to interpret, recall 
that larger factor loadings suggest that firing is less likely and smaller values suggest 
firing to have been more likely.  Since the factor loading for the duality successions is 
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significantly smaller than for the non-duality successions, the results support H2.  When a 
predecessor has been fired, the board is more likely to appoint a dual successor. 
In our sample slightly less than 35% of the successors were previously designated 
heir apparent for duality appointments, but about 49% were designated heirs in the non-
dual appointments.  This difference is significant at the 0.001 level (t = 3.71) and is 
consistent with H3.  We find that 39% of the dual appointments, but only 29% of the non-
dual appointments, are outside executives.  This difference is significant at the 0.001 
level (t =-2.82), and this result is consistent with H4.   
Executives who are simultaneously appointed as CEO and Chair are older than 
those appointed only as CEO.  The average age of executives appointed into dual 
positions is 54.1 years while the non-dual executives’ average age is only 50.5 years.  
The difference is significant at the 0.001 level (t = −6.31) and supports H5.  We also find 
that companies with dual appointments are significantly larger than those companies with 
non-dual appointments, and we therefore include firm size as a control variable in our 
analyses.  
Correlations and Logit Regression Analysis 
Table II contains a correlation matrix for our variables.  There are a number of 
variables that have statistically significant correlations.  As a result, we present our 
regressions first as single variable regressions and then in a multivariate format.  This 
approach lets us see the potential effects of multicollinearity, if any. 
-----Insert Table II about Here----- 
Table III displays the logit regression results.  The dependent variable in the logit 
regressions is a binary variable taking the value of 1 when the board appoints the 
successor to a dual position and is 0 when it is only a CEO appointment.  Since the 
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dependent variable is a binary variable, we employ logit regressions.  Because several of 
the explanatory variables are correlated, we first report simple single variable logit 
regressions with each independent variable, in order to avoid the potential problem of 
multi-collinearity. The single variable logit regressions are numbered 1-6. 
-----Insert Table III About Here----- 
In regression 1, the estimated coefficient for the industry adjusted ROAt-1 to t-4 is 
statistically insignificant.  As in the univariate tests, this result is inconsistent with H1.  
The estimated coefficient for the predecessor firing variable in regression 2 is negative as 
predicted by H2, and is statistically significant at the 0.001 level.  The estimated 
coefficient for the new CEO’s age in regression 3 is positive and significant at the 0.001 
level and supports the predictions of H5.   In regression 4, the estimated coefficient for 
CEO origin (being an outsider) variable is positive and significant at the 0.001 level. This 
result is consistent with the predictions of H4.  The estimated coefficient for the heir-
apparent binary variable in regression 5 is negative and significant at the 0.001 level 
supporting the predictions of H3.  In regression 6 the estimated coefficient for firm size is 
positive and significant at the 0.001 level, indicating that larger firms are more likely to 
make dual appointments.   
Regressions 7-10 in Table III are multiple variable logit regressions.  The signs 
and statistical significance of all of the independent variables, except new CEO outsider 
and new CEO designated heir, remain similar to the results found in the simple 
regressions.  Regression 7 includes all explanatory and control variables for our sample.  
The estimated coefficient for new CEO outsider is statistically insignificant.  The loss of 
significance suggests that there may be multi-collinearity with other variables.  Referring 
back to Table II, new CEO outsider is significantly correlated with the firing variable. 
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When the predecessor has been fired, it is more likely that an outsider is hired.  In 
addition, the successor origin variable is also highly correlated (at the 0.001 level) with 
the heir-apparent variable since none of the outsiders would have been heir apparent.   To 
correct for the possibility of multi-collinearity, we drop the CEO origin variable.  This 
yields a negative coefficient of greater significance for the heir apparent variable 
(regression 8).   
  
Robustness Tests 
In our sample, 39 CEO appointments occurred for individuals that were either 
board Chair, Vice-Chair, or former Chair.  Since this is a different type of appointment, 
we re-estimate our regressions, but we delete these 39 cases.  The signs and statistical 
significance levels of our coefficients remain unchanged, and therefore are not reported.   
A further concern is that we may not have adjusted for the past succession 
practices of each firm in our sample.  It is possible that some firms simply always prefer 
to have a dual leader while other firms do not, regardless of their current situation.  We 
therefore incorporate data on whether the previous CEO was in a dual position before 
each new CEO appointment.  We find that in 499 (67%) out of our 745 firms, the 
previous CEO was also the board chair. However, of firms that made a dual appointment 
for their new CEO, only 58% also had the old CEO in a dual position. This is compared 
to 71% of non-dual CEO appointments where the old CEO occupied both positions (with 
the difference significant in t-tests at the 0.001% level).  In our regression tests, an 
indicator for the duality of the old CEO takes a significant negative coefficient in all 
models, but does not change the signs or significance levels of the other variables, and is 
 24 
therefore not reported.  Overall, this means that firms were the old CEO was in both 
positions were significantly less likely to make a dual appointment for their new CEO.   
An alternative means of examining a firm’s past succession practices is to isolate 
those firms in our sample that experience multiple CEO successions over the sample 
period.  This yields 109 firms (207 observations) that make more than 1 CEO 
appointment.  Compared to firms that make only a single CEO appointment, these firms 
are more likely to make dual appointments (42% versus 27%, which is significant at 
0.05% in t-tests).  This is also consistent with the argument that firms going through 
extended periods of uncertainty, proxied for by this measure of CEO turnover, are more 
likely to opt for a dual appointment.  In regression #10, when we include a variable equal 
to 1 if the lagged appointment was to both CEO and chair positions, and equal to zero 
otherwise, it is significant at the 0.01 level (chi square = 8.15) in our regression model, 
while the signs and significance levels of the other variables remain unchanged.  This 
indicates that past CEO succession practices have some influence on the chance of a new 
CEO being appointed to both CEO and chair positions, although they do not explain all 
of the variation.  The increase in the R2 of a model including the lagged duality indicator 
suggests that this variable adds about 9% to the explanatory power of our model.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Duality occurs when one person holds both of a firm’s two top executive 
positions, CEO and Chair.  This leadership structure is very common in U.S. firms and 
generally occurs in the relay succession process in which the CEO is promoted to 
CEO/Chair (Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997). Our contribution to the literature is that 
we examine an alternative, the instances in which companies hire a person directly into 
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the CEO/Chair position.  We therefore build upon studies that examine the characteristics 
of firms employing a dual leadership structure (Faleye, 2007), by focusing on when the 
CEO succession process gives rise to duality.  Ocasio (1999) describes how informal 
rules guide corporate behavior in general, but more specifically how succession rules 
guide CEO succession decisions.  The type of succession leading to duality that we 
investigate is not as common as the relay succession process, and may, therefore, occur 
outside the traditional succession rules.   
We show that when there has been organizational stress that creates the need for a 
new leader, boards will often appoint an executive directly into a dual position.  This 
suggests that the organizational structure needs of a company may be situationally 
dependent.  Boards may not, in some situations, be able to wait for a CEO to gain 
experience before promoting the CEO into the dual positions.  In particular, when a 
company fires the former CEO, the board may perceive that an unambiguous leader is 
needed.  In these cases, boards are more likely to directly appoint the successor into the 
dual positions.  We also show that when boards appoint a dual executive, fewer of them 
have been designated as heir apparent.  This may be partially explained by the fact that 
many of the dual appointees are outsiders, but also by the fact that boards may not want 
to appoint an heir into a dual position before the heir has served their complete 
apprenticeship.  In addition, when boards appoint an outside successor, the successor is 
more likely to be appointed as both CEO and Chair.   
Boards must meet their fiduciary responsibility.  Appointing someone 
simultaneously as both CEO and Chair could bring accusations that the executive is not 
ready for both mantels.  Our results show that the average successor age of the dual 
executive appointments is greater by nearly three years than for those appointed only as 
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CEO.  This may give justification to the board decision since the older executive would 
have more experience.   
Overall, our results are consistent with dual appointments being made when a 
firm needs a strong and unambiguous leader.  We do not find evidence that dual 
appointments influence the firm’s short-term performance.  It is therefore unclear if 
proposals to limit dual appointments would be in the best interest of shareholders, 
because our research indicates that it is not agency conflicts, ex ante, that are driving the 
dual appointment decision.  Instead, our findings are consistent with dual appointments 
being made to optimally contract with a new manager at a time when the firm is subject 
to increased stress and uncertainty.   
Our study suffers from the following limitations.  First, our sample comes from 
the Execucomp database.  This database covers relatively large companies and those that 
receive considerable scrutiny from financial analysts.  Our results may, therefore, not be 
applicable to smaller firms.  Second, we do not have access to the actual decision process 
and discussions that occur in boards and lead to the hiring of one person into a dual role.  
Perhaps with other methodologies, future research could be directed toward this issue.  
Finally, we define organizational stress as the firing of a predecessor and poor financial 
performance and hypothesize that this stress creates the need for an unambiguous leader.  
There may be other factors that create this need.  For example, there may be certain 
industry situations and opportunities that create this need.  Or, there may be internal 
situations within the firm that are not readily apparent to outside observers and 
researchers that create this need.  Other research methodologies may be able to address 
these issues as well. 
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ENDNOTES 
1  It is interesting to note that when there has been poor prior performance and the board 
hires an outside CEO, the stock market reacts positively (Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers, and 
Owers, 1989).  So the market reacts positively when succession rules are followed (Shen 
and Canella, 2003) and when the situation requires succession rules to be ignored and the 
board ignores them (Lubatkin et al, 1989). 
2 This alternative perspective on duality has its roots in stewardship theory.  Under 
stewardship theory, executives are motivated to act in the best interests of a company’s 
stakeholders, including stockholders.   
3  There is considerable anecdotal evidence supporting the proposition that outsiders have 
increased bargaining positions.  Having viewed numerous dean and department head 
searches, we have observed that outsiders are more successful in bargaining for increased 
departmental resources and lucrative contracts.  The AACSB salary surveys always show 
that newly hired full professors make more, on average, than full professors, in general.  
In the sports world, we observe this as well.  For example, Bill Parcels left the Patriots, a 
successful franchise, to join the Jets so that he could be not only head coach but also 
general manager. 
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics for Dual Versus Non-dual Successions 
 
The table presents average figures for our sample of 745 CEO successions, with standard deviations given in 
parentheses.  All figures are measured during the year of CEO succession, which occurs between 1992 and 1999, 
except total assets, which are as of year t-1, and industry-adjusted ROA, which is the average over years 1 to 4.  *** 
indicates p ≤ 0.001.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Full Sample Dual 
Appointments 
Non-dual 
Appointments 
 
t-statistic 
1. Dual Succession 
Indicator 
 
30.74% 
(46.17%) 
N=229 N=516  
2. Industry Adjusted 
ROA t-1 to t-4      
 
2.12% 
(9.21) 
2.12 
(8.14) 
2.12 
 (9.65) 
-0.00 
3. Industry Adjusted 
ROA t+1 to t+4 
1.23% 
(14.96) 
0.87 
(13.32) 
1.38  
(15.63) 
0.46 
4. Old CEO Not Fireda 0.93 
(0.25) 
0.85 
(0.36) 
0.97 
(0.18) 
6.06*** 
5.  New CEO Age 
 
51.58 
(6.94) 
54.12 
(7.74) 
50.45  
(6.24) 
-6.31*** 
6. New CEO Outsider 32.08% 
(46.71) 
39.30% 
(48.95) 
28.87% 
(45.36) 
-2.82*** 
7. New CEO Designated 
Heir 
44.56% 
(49.74) 
34.50% 
(47.64) 
49.03% 
(50.04) 
3.71*** 
8. Total Assetsb 
($000,000’s) 
4,082.67 
(13,631.83) 
6,589.09 
(16,795.13) 
3,006.75 
(7,802.63) 
 
-3.26*** 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
a  To measure CEO firing, we combined three variables utilizing a factor analysis.  The three variables are 
predecessor CEO age, predecessor CEO board Chair status (1=yes, 0=no), and predecessor CEO new job status 
(1=yes, 0=no).  The variable is the factor loadings from the three variables.  A large value suggests firing is less 
likely while a low value suggests firing is likely. 
b We show the dollar value of total assets in this table, but use the log of assets in the statistical tests in this table and 
in the subsequent tables.   
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Table II: Correlation Matrix of Variables  
This table present correlation coefficients for the variables in our sample of 745 CEO successions over the period from 1992 to 1999.  *** indicates p ≤ 0.001, ** 
indicates p ≤ 0.01, and * indicates p ≤ 0.05.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Dual Succession Indicator 1.00        
2. Industry Adjusted ROA t-1 to t-4         0.00012 1.00       
3. Industry Adjusted ROA t+1 to t+4 -0.01590 0.57740*** 1.00      
4. Old CEO Not Fireda -0.21710*** -0.00488 0.00528 1.00     
5. New CEO Age 0.24366*** -0.02508 0.02290 -0.09612*** 1.00    
6. New CEO Outsider 0.10305*** -0.03759 -0.02661 -0.11644*** 0.07352* 1.00   
7. New CEO Designated Heir -0.13491*** 0.02389 0.02025 0.20321*** -0.08438* -0.45420*** 1.00  
8. Ln (Total Assets)  0.09577*** 0.01155 0.07950* 0.06588 0.11320*** -0.00895 0.26021*** 1.00 
a  To measure CEO firing, we combined three variables utilizing a factor analysis.  The three variables are predecessor CEO age, predecessor CEO board Chair 
status (1=yes, 0=no), and predecessor CEO new job status (1=yes, 0=no).  The variable is the factor loadings from the three variables.  A large value suggests 
firing is less likely while a low value suggests firing is likely. 
 37 
Table III: Logistic Regression Analysis 
   This table presents coefficient estimates from logistic regression models where the dependent variable is 1 if CEO appointment also includes appointment to 
chair and is 0 otherwise in our sample of 745 CEO successions over the period from 1992 to 1999.  Chi-squared statistics are given in parentheses. *** indicates 
p ≤ 0.001, ** indicates p ≤ 0.01, and * indicates p ≤ 0.05.   
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Reg. 
 
Constant 
Industry-
Adjusted 
ROA t-1 to t-4 
Old CEO 
_Not 
Fireda_ 
New CEO’s 
___Age___ 
New CEO 
_Outsider_ 
New CEO 
Designated 
Heir 
 
Ln(Assets) 
Lagged 
Duality 
Indicator 
 
___R2___ 
1 -0.8124*** 
(99.38) 
99.38 
(0.00) 
      0.00% 
2 0.7221* 
(5.96) 
 -1.6669*** 
(29.38) 
     5.90% 
3 -5.0057*** 
(56.38) 
  0.0802*** 
(41.04) 
    8.31% 
4 -0.9709*** 
(95.03) 
   0.4668*** 
(7.85) 
   1.46% 
5 -0.5615*** 
(30.11) 
    -0.6023*** 
(13.39) 
  2.58% 
6 -1.4354*** 
(43.18) 
     0.0959*** 
(9.98) 
 2.19% 
7 -3.6742*** 
(22.75) 
0.00260 
(0.06) 
-1.5142*** 
(20.34) 
0.0711*** 
(29.48) 
0.1297 
(0.41) 
-0.4605* 
(5.23) 
0.1062*** 
(11.08) 
 16.09% 
8 -3.6023*** 
(22.49) 
0.00247 
(0.06) 
-1.5201*** 
(20.55) 
0.0711*** 
(29.49) 
 -0.5204*** 
(8.49) 
0.1075*** 
(11.50) 
 16.02% 
9 -3.3768*** 
(20.26) 
0.00201 
(0.04) 
-1.4557*** 
(19.80) 
0.0758*** 
(34.45) 
0.1974 
(0.99) 
-0.2896 
(2.20) 
  13.96% 
10 -4.5305*** 
(11.10) 
0.000692 
(0.00) 
-1.2658* 
(5.23) 
0.0884*** 
(13.53) 
-0.2284 
(0.43) 
-1.0585** 
(6.92) 
0.1199* 
(4.76) 
0.9676** 
(8.14) 
25.81% 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a  To measure CEO firing, we combined three variables utilizing a factor analysis.  The three variables are predecessor CEO age, predecessor CEO board Chair 
status (1=yes, 0=no), and predecessor CEO new job status (1=yes, 0=no).  The variable is the factor loadings from the three variables.  A large value suggests 
firing is less likely while a low value suggests firing is likely. 
 
